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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SYNERGETICS, a Utah Limited 
Partnership, by and through its 
general partner, LANCER 
INDUSTRIES, INC., a corporation; 
and ADDLAND ENTERPRISES, INC., 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs. 
MARATHON RANCHING CO., 
LTD., and HANS W. ROECK, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
Case No. 19143 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for money damages and for rescission of an agreement 
providing for the exchange of certain real property owned by defendant 
Marathon Ranching Co., Ltd., located in the Province of Saskatchewan, 
Canada, for an ocean-going sailboat allegedly owned by plaintiff Addland 
Enterprises, based upon averments that the transaction was the product of 
defendant's fraud, misrepresentations and deceit. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
After the district· court denied defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of 
personal jurisdiction, default judgment was entered against defendants when 
Hans W. Roeck did not appear for the taking of his deposition pursuant to an 
order of the court. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment and remand to the district 
court for entry of an order dismissing plaintiff's complaint for lack of 
personal jurisdiction. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On March 9, 1983, plaintiffs filed a complaint against defendants, 
seeking money damages and rescission of an agreement providing for the 
exchange of certain real property owned by defendant Marathon Ranching 
Co., Ltd., located in the Province of Saskatchewan, Canada, for an 
ocean-going sailboat allegedly owned by plaintiff, Addland Enterprises, Inc., 
then located in the State of California. The complaint and amended complaint 
allege that the exchange agreement was the product of defendants' fraud, 
misrepresentation and deceit. 
The plaintiffs, respectively are a Utah limited partnership, whose 
general partner is an Illinois corporation, and a California corporation; and 
the defendants, respectively, are a Canadian Corporation and a Canadian 
citizen residing in California. 
Prior to May 23, 1980, plaintiffs and defendants carried on negotiations 
in California, and Canada, for the exchange of Canadian property for an 
ocean-going sailboat (R. 25). On May 23, 1980, the negotiations culminated 
in the execution of an agreement in the City of Saskatoon in the Province of 
Saskatchewan, Canada, which provided that Marathon Ranching Co. , Ltd .. 
would convey to Y. M. S. , a Utah partnership, certain Canadian real propert\ 
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in consideration for an ocean-going sailboat, the "Enterprise," being sold to 
Ranching by Addland Enterprises, Inc., a California corporation (R. 
25, 16-20). Synergetics was the previous owner of the sailboat. 
Concurrently therewith, on May 23, 1980, the "Enterprise" was conveyed from 
Addland Enterprises, Inc. , to Marathon Ranching, under an instrument 
executed in Saskatchewan (R. 016-020). Thereafter, prior to filing the 
instant lawsuit, the parties exchanged telephone calls and correspondence 
regarding the agreement, and Hans Roeck came to Utah on a skiing vacation 
with his family at which time the agreement was discussed ( R. 027-029). 
Marathon Ranching Co., Ltd., is a corporation organized under the laws 
of the Province of Saskatchewan, Canada, with its principal place of business 
in Saskatoon (R. 24). Hans Roeck, its president, is a Canadian citizen 
residing in California. Neither defendant has ever been authorized to 
conduct business in Utah nor have either transacted business or maintained 
an office, other business facility or even a telephone in Utah (R. 024-025). 
No officer, director, agent or employee of either defendant has ever been 
stationed in Utah, nor were any sent to Utah to enter into negotiations for 
the purchase by defendants of the "Enterprise", which culminated in the 
purchase agreement executed in Saskatoon on May 23, 1980 (R. 24-25). 
Marathon Ranching Co., Ltd., and Hans Roeck responded to plaintiffs' 
complaint and amended complaint by appearing specially and moving to quash 
service of summons and to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction (R. 
21-22). ln support of their motion to dismiss, defendant Hans Roeck 
submitted an affidavit contesting the court's jurisdiction. Plaintiffs did not 
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submit counter-affidavits or any other evidence to controvert Roeck's 
affidavit. 
After a hearing, the Honorable David B. Dee denied defendants' motion 
to dismiss by an order entered on June 1, 1982, without findings of fact, 
conclusions of law or a memorandum decision (R. 42-43). Defendants filed a 
petition to grant an interlocutory appeal to the Utah Supreme Court (R. 
87-89). 
At a hearing on July 15, 1982, the district court stayed all proceedings 
pending grant or denial by the Utah Supreme Court of defendants• petition to 
grant an appeal (R. 84-86). The court directed that should the Supreme 
Court deny defendant's petition, they were required to file an answer or 
other responsive pleading to plaintiffs' amended complaint and to produce 
defendant Hans Roeck for the taking of his deposition within five business 
days thereafter ( R. 85). 
On July 22, 1982, the Utah Supreme Court denied defendants' petition to 
grant an appeal, and defendants filed an answer to the amended complaint 
(R. 66-70), again raising the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction. 
On July 28, 1983, defendants moved the district court for a protective 
order on the grounds, inter alia, that all of the corporate books and records 
of defendant, Marathon Ranching Co., Ltd., a non-resident Canadian 
corporation, were kept and maintained in Canada, and that it would be 
unduly burdensome for defendant Roeck, who was under doctor's orders nor 
-- 02a 
to travel at the time, and who was then in Hawaii, to come to Salt Lake City 
for the purpose of taking his deposition (R. 71-78). Plaintiffs responded by 
moving to strike defendants' answer and award a default judgment, and for 
an order compelling defendants to disclose the whereabouts of the boat and to 
cause it to be brought to a place designated by the court and held in storage 
pending· the outcome of the litigation. 
The court denied plaintiffs motions for sanctions, and to compel 
disclosure of the boat's whereabouts and to require it to be placed in 
storage, and ordered the defendant Roeck appear for his deposition no later 
than August 27, 1982 (R. 137-38). 
On August 18, 1982, defendants moved for an order vacating the 
deposition date and for a protective order allowing the deposition of Hans W. 
Roeck to be taken on September 13, 1982 (R. 113-16). 
On August 26, 1982, the district court entered an order requiring 
defendant Roeck to appear for a deposition no later than September 3, 1982 
(R. 167-68). The court further ordered that in the event Roeck failed to 
appear, upon the ex parte application of plaintiff, defendants' answer would 
be stricken and default judgment entered (R. 167-68). 
Pursuant to the notice of plaintiff Synergetics, the deposition of 
de!endant Hans Roeck, was set for September 3, 1982, at 11: 00 a. m. 
Defendant Roeck appeared for the deposition at the date and time specified in 
the notice. Following a series of questions concerning his personal life, 
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Roeck caused the deposition to be terminated by refusing to answer further 
questions and leaving the deposition (R. 204-06). 
Following the aborted deposition, Roeck indicated his willingness to 
attend a rescheduled deposition and to submit to any proper questions posed 
by plaintiffs' attorneys (R. 206). Plaintiffs refused to accommodate Roeck's 
request and insisted that they were entitled to entry of a default judgment. 
On October 6, 1982, plaintiff Synergetics, filed a Supplemental Motion to 
Strike Defendants' Answer and to Enter a Default Judgment, or to Impose 
Sanctions Against Defendants, and for the court to issue "the equitable 
equivalent of a writ of replevin" to protect plaintiffs against loss of the boat. 
At a hearing on November 18, 1982, the district court denied plaintiffs' 
motion, but ordered defendants to produce Roeck for the taking of his 
deposition by or before November 29, 1982 (R. 223-25). At the time the 
order was entered, Hans Roeck was outside of the continental United States, 
out of communication with his attorneys, and received no notice of the 
discovery order or default proceedings (R. 257). 
Upon Roeck's non-appearance, the court entered default judgment 
against defendants on March 14, 1983. Plaintiffs were awarded judgment 
against defendants in the sum of $352, 000 for conversion of the subject 
sailboat; title to the sailboat was quieted in plaintiffs; plaintiffs were awarded 
$100, 000 in rental value of the sailboat; plaintiffs were awarded punitive 
damages in the sum of $200, 000; all contracts and agreements between 
8 
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[J!illntiffs and defendants were rescinded; and plaintiffs were awarded their 
costs ( R. 279-82). In awarding damages, including punitive damages, the 
trial court did not hear any evidence or conduct a hearing. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT LACKED PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER THE 
NON-RESIDENT DEFENDANTS BECAUSE INSUFFICIENT MINIMUM 
CONTACTS EXIST BETWEEN DEFENDANTS AND THE STATE OF 
UTAH. 
Respondents do not allege that appellants are "doing business" in Utah 
sufficiently for general in personam jurisdiction to attach (R. 30-33, 240-243). 
See Burt Drilling, Inc. v. Portadrill, 608 P.2d 244, 246 (Utah 1980). 
Therefore, if jurisdiction over the non-resident defendants is to be had at 
all, it must be under the Utah Long-Arm Statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-22 
(Rep!. 1977). Under that statute, a plaintiff must show that the 
claims upon which suit is brought "arose out of one or more of defendant's 
contacts within this state as set forth in Section 78-27-24." Roskelley ! Co. 
v. Lerco, Inc., 610 P.2d 1307, 1309 (Utah 1980). Section 78-27-24 
enumerates several varieties of contacts that warrant the court's exercise of 
personal jurisdiction over non-residents. Section 78-27-24 provides as 
follows: 
78-27-24. Jurisdiction over nonresidents - Acts submitting 
person to jurisdiction. Any person, notwithstanding section 
16-10-102, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who in 
person or through an agent does any of the following enumerated 
acts, submits himself, and if an individual, his personal 
representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to 
any claim arising from: 
(1) The transaction of any business within this state; 
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(2) Contracting to supply services or goods in this state; 
(3) The causing of any injury within this state whether 
tortious or by breach of warranty; 
(4) The ownership, use, or possession of any real estate 
situated in this state. 
(5) Contracting to insure any person, property or risk 
located within this state at the time of contracting. 
( 6) With respect to actions of divorce and separate 
maintenance, the maintenance in this state of a matrimonial domicile 
at the time the claim arose or the commission in this state of the act 
giving rise to the claim. 
Plaintiffs maintain in their amended complaint that defendants are subject 
to the jurisdiction of the Utah courts under § 78-27-24(1) ("transaction of 
any business within this state") and § 78-27-24(3) ("causing of any injury 
within this state") (R. 31). 
Respondents indisputably had the burden of proving facts necessary to 
establish the personal jurisdiction of the district court. See, Air 
Kaman, Inc. Penn-Aire Aviation, Inc., 526 F.Supp. 66, 68 (D. Conn. 
1981). A plaintiff must plead sufficient material facts to establish a basis for 
jurisdiction under a state's long-arm statute. Hickock Teaching Systems, 
Inc. Equitech, 421 So. 2d 722, 723 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Verges'!_· 
Lomas !_ Nettleton Financial Corp. 642 S.W. 2d 820, 821 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1982). See Fleet Leasing Inc. District Court, Colo. ' 649 
P.2d 1074, 1078 (1982); Craighead, Ark. ' 644 s.w. 
2d 256, 257 (1983); United States Dental .!_r:lstitute American Association of 
Orthodonists, 396 F.Supp. 565 (D.C. Ill. 1975); Texair Flyers District 
Court, 180 Colo. 432, 506 P. 2d 367 ( 1973); Wuertz v. Garvey, Minn. 
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, 178 N. W. 2d 630 (1970). In meeting this burden mere conclusory 
allegations do not suffice. Howard '!... Craighead, supra, 644 S. W. 2d at 257; 
Nacci '!..· Volkswagen America, 297 A.2d 638 (Del. Super. Ct. 1972). If, 
in the present case, a defendant challenges plaintiff's jurisdictional 
allegations by affidavit, the plaintiff must then support its allegations by 
affidavit or other proof. Hickock Teaching Systems, Inc. '!... Equitech, supra 
4 21 So. 2d at 77 3. On a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, if 
a defendant's affidavit contesting jurisdiction is not refuted by a 
counter-affidavit filed by the plaintiff, the facts alleged in the defendant's 
affidavit are taken as true. Caicos Petroleum Service Corp. '!..· Hunsaker, 
551 F. Supp. 152, 153 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Kutner'!..· DeMassa, 96 Ill. App. 3d 
243, , 421 N.E. 2d 231, 235 (1981); Oddi v. Mariner Denver, Inc., 461 
F.Supp. 306, 310 (S.D. Ind. 1978). 
In the present case, the plaintiffs alleged in their amended complaint 
that prior to the execution of the agreement of May 23, 1980, defendant, 
Hans Roeck, "made several telephone calls to offers [sic] and agents of the 
plaintiffs, Synergetics and Lancer, into the State of Utah, to discuss the 
transaction which is the subject matter of plaintiffs' complaint herein" (R. 
31). In his affidavit in support of defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of 
personal jurisdiction, Hans Roe ck stated that the negotiations for the 
exchange of plaintiff's sailboat for the Saskatchewan property occurred in 
California and Canada, and that no agent, officer, director or employee of 
Marathon Ranching Co., Ltd., had ever been sent into the State of Utah to 
conduct business ( R. 24-25). Plaintiffs did not controvert the statement in 
Roeck's affidavit that the May 23, 1980, agreement was negotiated in Canada 
and California, not Utah. 
11 
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Plaintiffs' factual allegations contained in their amended complaint and 
the affidavit of Robert D. Kent annexed thereto, in support of personal 
jurisdiction, are as follows: First, prior to the execution of the May 23, 
1980, agreement, Roeck made several telephone calls into Utah to discuss the 
transaction. Secondly, after the execution of the May 23, 1980, agreement, 
Roeck wrote several letters made several telephone calls into Utah from 
California, Canada and elsewhere to plaintiffs' officers concerning the 
transactions. Last, on or about March 17, 1981, plaintiffs allege that Roeck 
came to Utah and negotiated, an agreement modifying the May 23, 1980, 
agreement (R. 30-33). 
Appellants' single isolated physical contact with Utah for the purpose of 
a skiing trip, at which time an incidental negotiations of a modification to the 
May 23, 1980, agreement occurred, does not afford a basis for personal 
jurisdiction in an action to rescind the original agreement. 
In Roskelley ! Co. v. Lerco, Inc., 610 P.2d 1307 (Utah 1980), plaintiff 
brought an action against defendant, a Kentucky corporation, alleging breach 
of an oral contract to pay a commission in connection with the sale of certain 
machinery by defendant for use in Utah by a Utah corporation. The 
defendant moved to quash service of process, supporting the motion by an 
affidavit of its president. The affidavit recited that plaintiff had telephoned 
defendant in Kentucky to inquire about the possibility of acting as broker for 
the defendant in Utah. Defendants sold machinery to U.S. Steel Credit 
Corporation, which was ultimately leased to Utah American Steel and installed 
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rn Utah. Thereafter, defendants' officers and representatives traveled to 
Utah to supervise the installation of the machinery. 
In reversing the lower court and ordering plaintiff's complaint dismissed 
for lack of personal jurisdiction, the Utah Supreme Court noted that plaintiffs 
could not rely upon defendants' Utah contacts with respect to the installation 
of the machinery to form a jurisdictional basis for their contract claim. 
But we are not here concerned with defendant's contract for 
the sale of goods to U.S. Steel Credit Corporation, nor with the 
installation of the equipment at the Utah American Steel plant, and 
plaintiff's claim does not arise out of those activities. 
* * * 
Here, defendant's purposeful activities within this State 
consisted of its sale of equipment ultimately destined for installation 
in this State, and its entry into this State for the purpose of 
overseeing the installation of that equipment. These contacts would 
be sufficient for the establishment of limited jurisdiction if this 
litigation concerned an action for breach of warranty or negligence 
in installing the equipment, brought by Utah American Steel or 
U.S. Steel Credit Corporation, but this plaintiff cannot avail himself 
of such contacts for the purpose of his claim on an entirely 
different contract. To do so he must show that this State has 
general jurisdiction; to wit, the defendant has conducted substantial 
and continuous business in this State. Plaintiff has shown no 
purposeful activity on the part of defendant within this State by 
which it could be said that defendant knew or should have known 
that it was subjecting itself to the jurisdict10n of our Courts, for 
the purposes of this alleged contract for commissions. 
610 P.2d at 1309, 1312 (emphasis added). 
All of plaintiffs' causes of action as set forth in their complaint and 
amended complaint arise under "various purported contracts and agreements" 
entered into in May, 1980 ( R. 2-3). The relief prayed for was rescission of 
that agreement, together with compensatory and punitive damages (R. 4). 
The purported modification agreement of March 17, 1981, concerning which 
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Roeck made his only physical contact within the State of Utah, is not at issue 
in this litigation. 
As to subjecting appellants to personal jurisdiction in Utah for the 
purpose of suit on the May 23, 1980, agreement, there are only two factors to 
which respondents can point tying Marathon Ranching Co., Ltd. and Hans 
Roeck to Utah, viz., telephone calls to Utah prior to the transaction, and 
telephone calls and letters to Utah subsequent to the transaction. With 
respect to the pre-May, 1980, telephone calls, they did not involve 
negotiations for the sale and purchase of the subject sailboat ( R. 25). It is 
evident from the United States Supreme Court cases that it would be 
unconstitutionally impermissible and unfair to subject appellants to the 
personal jurisdiction of the Utah Courts under these circumstances. 
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment serves as a 
limitation on state assertions of jurisdiction over non-resident defendants 
pursuant to long-arm statutes. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. "'!.._. Woodson, 
444 U.S. 286, 291, 100 S.Ct. 559, 564, 62 L.Ed. 2d 490, (1980). 
The purpose of the Utah long-arm statute is to permit the exercise of 
jurisdiction over non-residents to the extent permitted by the due process 
clause. Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-22 (Rep!. 1977). Therefore, a court must 
engage in a "search for the outer limits of what due process permits." 
Tietloff "'!.._· Lift-a-Loft Corp., Ind. App. 441 N.E. 2d 986, 989 
(1982). The scope of the due process inquiry has evolved from numerous 
Supreme Court cases and is well-settled. Peanut Corp. of America v. 
Hollywood Brands, Inc., 696 F. 2d 311, 314 (4th Cir. 1982). 
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In determining the constitutional reach of a state's personal jurisdiction 
over a non-resident who maintains only a single or few contacts with the 
forum courts have applied a three-pronged test: 
First, the defendant must have purposefully availed itself of 
the privilege of acting within the forum state thus invoking the 
benefits and protections of its laws. Hanson v. Denckla, supra, 
357 U.S. 235 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed. 2d 1283-(1958). Secondly, 
the cause of action must arise from defendant's activities within the 
forum state. See Southern Mach. Co. v. Mochasco Indus., Inc., 
401 F.2d 374 (6th Cir. 1968); Electric Regulator Corp. Sterling 
Extruder Corp. , 280 F. Supp. 550 ( D. Conn. 1968). Lastly, the acts 
of the defendant must have a substantial enough connection with 
the forum state to make the exercise of jurisdiction over it 
reasonable. International Shoe Co. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 66 
S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945); See Southern Mach Co. v. Mohasco 
Indus., Inc., 401 F.2d 374 (6Til Cir. 1968); See-also In-Flight 
DeV1ces Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc. , 466 F. 2d 220 (6th Cir. 
1972); Kai:irkene v:-Xmencan BBR, Inc., 313 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 
1963). --
Proctor Schwartz v. Cleveland Lumber Co., 228 Pa. Super. 12, ' 323 
A.2d 11, 15 (1974). Accord, Balcom Chemicals, Inc., 328 N.W. 2d 
476, 478-79 n.4 (S.D. 1983); Siskind v. Villa Foundation for Education, 
Inc., 642 S.W. 2d 434, 436 (Tex. 1982). 
The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the well-established rule of 
International Shoe Co. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 
90 L.Ed. 95, (1945), that due process requires that certain "minimum 
contacts" exist between the non-resident defendant and the forum state before 
a court may exercise personal jurisdiction. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. 
Woodson, supra, 444 U.S. at 291, 100 S. Ct. at 564. In that case the 
Supreme Court also refined the "minimum contacts" doctrine by distinguishing 
its two separate functions: (1) ensuring a fair and reasonable forum for the 
defendant. and (2) ensuring territorial limits on state power. Id. at 292, 100 
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S.Ct. at 564. The Supreme Court explained that the protection against 
inconvenient litigation is founded on a concept of reasonableness or fairness 
with a primary emphasis on the burden to the defendant. Id. at 292, 1011 
S.Ct. at 564. The defendant's contacts with the forum must be "such that 
maintenance of the suit 'does not offend traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice.'" Id. at 292, 100 S. Ct. at 564, quoting International Shoe 
Co. v. Washington, supra, 326 U.S. at 316, 66 S.Ct. at 158. In this 
regard, it is critical that the "defendant's conduct and connection with the 
forum state are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into 
court there." World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v, Woodson, supra 444 U.S. at 
297, 100 S.Ct. at 567. 
The Utah decisions are consistent with the foregoing. 
In Carnes Corp., 611 P.2d 378, 380 (1980), the Utah Supreme 
Court held that the due process inquiry mandates consideration of (1) 
whether the cause of action arises out of or has a substantial connection with 
defendant's activity within the state; (2) the balancing of the convenience of 
the parties and the interest of the state in assuming jurisdiction; and (3) the 
character of the defendant's activity within the state. 
In Mallory Engineering v. Ted R. Brown ! Assoc., 618 P.2d 1004, 1007 
appeal dismissed, 449 U.S. 1029 (1980), the Utah Supreme Court described 
the standard for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a non-residenl 
defendant as follows: 
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The resultant standard for determining a nonresident's 
amenability to the jurisdiction of the state courts is not whether the 
nonresident is "present" in the state, but rather whether the 
nonresident has such contacts with the "state of the forum as make 
it reasonsable, in the context of our federal system of government, 
to require the (nonresident) to defend the particular suit which is 
brought." [Emphasis added.] This reasonableness standard, 
incorporating the requirements of fair play and substantial justice, 
looks to the quality and nature of the nonresident's contacts with 
the forum state. Therefore, the central concern of the inquiry into 
personal jurisdiction is the relationship of the defendant, the 
forum, and the litigation, to each other. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The use of the telephone, mail, and other arteries of communication are 
consistently and decisively held by courts of all ranks and jurisdictions to be 
insufficient activity within the forum state to allow jurisdiction. "The use of 
interstate facilities (telephone, the mail), the making of payments in the 
forum State, and the provision for delivery within the forum state are 
secondary or anciliary factors and cannot alone provide the 'minimum contacts' 
required by due process." Scullin Steel Co . .:::'.:· National Railway Utilization 
Corp., 676 F.2d 309, 314 (8th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted). See, 
Jadair, Inc. Walt Keeler 679 F.2d 131 (7th Cir) cert. denied, 103 
S.Ct. 258 (1982); Mountaire Feeds, Impex, §_. 677 F.2d 651 
(8th Cir. 1982); Leney v. Plum Grove Bank, 670 F.2d 878 (10th Cir. 1982); 
Kransco Manufacturing .:::'.:. Markwitz, 656 F. 2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1981); Cascade 
Corp. v. Hiab-Foco AB, 619 F.2d 36 (9th Cir. 1980); Thos. P. Gonzalez 
Corp. v. Consejo Nacional de Producion, 614 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1980); 
Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Construction Co., 597 F.2d 
596 (7th Cir. 1979); Cives Corp. v. American Electric Power Co., 
550 F.Supp. 1155 (D.Me. 1982); Terrydale Liquidating Trust v. Gramlich, 
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549 F.Supp. 529 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Fischer v. Hilton. 549 F.Supp. 389 
(D.Del. 1982); Freedom Forge Corp. ':'._· Jersey Forging Works, 549 F.Supp 
99 (M.D. Pa. 1982); Coil Co. v. Weather-Twin Corp. , 539 F. Supp. 464 
(S.D.N.Y. 1982); Breiner Equipment Co.':'.· Dynaquip, Inc., 539 F.Supp. 204 
(E.D.Mo. 1982); C.F.H. Enterprises ':'._· Heatcool, 538 F.Supp. 774 CD.Colo. 
1982); Douglas Battery Manufacturing Co. v. Taylor Auto Supply, 
537 F.Supp. 1072 (M.D.N.C. 1982); Ruggieri v. General Well Service, lnc., 
535 F.Supp. 525 (D.Colo. 1982); Carter Oil Co. v. Apex Towing Co., 
532 F.Supp. 364 (E.D.Ark. 1981); Kennedy v. Ziesmann, 526 F. Supp. 1328 
(E.D.Ky. 1981); Infomed v. Healthcare of Louisville, 526 F.Supp. 1287 
(D. N .J. 1981); Associated Inns ! Restaurant Co. ':'._. Development Associates, 
516 F.Supp. 1023 (D.Colo. 1981); Dogan ':'._· Harbert Construction .. 
507 F.Supp. 254 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Craig v. General Finance Corp., 
504 F.Supp. 1033 (D.Md. 1980); Baron & Co. v. Bank New Jersey, 
497 F.Supp. 534 (E.D.Pa. 1980); Sayles Biltmore Bleacheries, Inc. v. 
Soft-Fab Textile Processors, 440 F.Supp. 1010 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); McQuay Inc. 
':'._. S_amuel Schlosberg, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 902 (D. Minn. 1971); Coast to Coast 
Marketing Co. ':'._· Q ! Metal Products Co., 130 Ariz. 506, 637 P. 2d 308 (Ct. 
App. 1981); Tube Turns Division of Chemetron Corp. ':'.· Patterson Co .. 
562 S.W.2d 99 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978); Kreisler Manufacturing Corp.':'._ Homstad 
Goldsmith, 322 N. W. 2d 567 (:vlinn. 1982); Shady Valley Park & Pool v. 
Dimmic, 576 S.W.2d 579 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979). 
Plaintiffs' claim that long·-arm jurisdiction exists pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-27-24(3) ("causing of any injury within this state") (R. 31), io 
decisively refuted in the case of Hydroswift Corp. v. Louie's Boats & 
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Inc., 27 Utah 2d 233, 494 P. 2d 532 (Utah 1972). In Hydroswift, plaintiff, a 
Utah corporation, sold boats to defendant, a foreign corporation. Defendant 
rdused to pay for the boats, claiming that they were defective and hence 
unacceptable. Plaintiff brought suit in Utah for conversion. Defendant 
appeared specially and moved to quash service of process. In affirming the 
lower court's order granting defendant's motion to quash, the Utah Supreme 
Court rejected plaintiff's argument that the conversion, if one took place, 
committed in Oregon, constituted "the causing of any injury" (i.e., 
nonpayment of the purchase price) in Utah. 
Plaintiff's assert a second jurisdictional basis under the long-arm 
statute, Utah Code Ann. 
this state") (R. 30-31). 
78-27-24(1) ("transaction of any business within 
When considered within the framework of due 
process, it is quite apparent that defendants' Utah contacts are insufficient to 
support the lower court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over them. 
ln the case of Hydraulics Unlimited Manufacturing Co. v. B/J 
Manufacturing Co., 323 F.Supp. 996 (D. Colo.), aff'd 449 F.2d 775 (10th 
Cir. 1971), the Kansas defendants learned of a potential patent violation by 
Colorado plaintiffs. Defendants came to Colorado to inspect the patented 
item. Following their visit they threatened plaintiff with a suit for patent 
infringement. 
plaintiffs and 
Negotiations for a non-exclusive license agreement between 
defendants occurred in Kansas, followed by the plaintiffs 
signing the agreement in Colorado while the defendants executed it in Kansas. 
Subsequently, plaintiffs sued to declare the patent invalid. Defendants 
moved to quash service of process and to dismiss the complaint for lack of 
19 
02a 
personal jurisdiction. Plaintiffs relied on the "transaction of any business 
within the state" provision of the Colorado long-arm statute for personal 
jurisdiction over defendants. The district court held, and the circuit court 
affirmed, that minimal contacts were lacking even though the defendants had 
actually been present in Colorado prior to the execution of the contract. 
Associated Inns & Restaurant Co. v. Development Associates, 516 
F. Supp. 1023 (D. Colo. 1981), involved a more recent interpretation of the 
same provision of the Colorado long-arm statute, which is similar to that of 
Utah. Associated Inns was an action to recover damages arising from two 
hotel management agreements and to collect on a promissory noted executed 
by some of the defendants. The first contract and the promissory note were 
executed while the plaintifr s corporate offices were in Ohio. Later plaintiff 
moved its offices to Denver, Colorado. Defendant went to Denver several 
times to discuss details of the operation of the contract with plaintiff. Suit 
was filed in federal district court in Colorado and defendants moved to 
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. 
The court held that there was no jurisdiction over defendant regarding 
one contract, as follows: 
While it is true that the defendant voluntarily came to Colorado 
to discuss some details of the management agreement with plaintiff, 
I believe that "basic considerations of fairness" under the 
International Shoe test dictate that these contacts are an 
msuffic1ent jurisdiction. It was only because plaintiff 
moved its offices to Colorado that the defendants ever came to 
Colorado to discuss the contract. Defendants' willingness to 
continue to deal with plaintiff after plaintifrs move to Colorado is 
not a sufficient basis for jurisdiction. See, Kulka v. Superior 
Court, 436 U.S. 84, 97-98, 98 S.Ct. 1690-.-1699-1700,-56 L.Ed.2d 
T32Tl978). 
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Associated Inns, 516 F.Supp. at 1026. The second contract was executed in 
Oregon, after the plaintiffs had moved to Denver, Colorado. 
Thereafter a meeting was held in Colorado between plaintiffs and defendants 
regarding· the operational details of this contract. The court held that 
"defendant's participating in a single meeting with plaintiff in Colorado may 
still not be a sufficient basis for jurisdiction . . .. " Associated Inns, 
516 F.Supp. at 1027. 
The court also held there was no jurisdiction over the promissory note 
cause of action as the only contacts relating to Colorado involving it were 
interstate mail correspondence. 
In Friedr. Zoellner (New York) Corp. Tex 396 F.2d 300 
(2d Cir. 1968), a New York corporation brought suit in New York against a 
Texas corporation for the loss of certain metals and ores which occurred in a 
warehouse rented by the defendant in New Orleans. It brought suit 
immediately following a meeting between plaintiff and the president of 
defendant and his counsel met in New York plaintiff in an attempt to resolve 
the difficulties between the parties. When that meeting failed to achieve the 
desired result, plaintiff brought suit. The court could not find any 
Jurisdiction based upon a section of the New York long-arm statute which 
provides jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who "commits a tortious act 
without the state causing injury to person or property within the state . 
if he ... expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences 
rn the state und derive substantial revenue from interstate or international 
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commerce." Freidr. Zoelner, 396 F. 2d at The injury did not occur in 
New York, said the court, as the loss occurred in New Orleans. The court 
was also unable to find jurisdiction based upon the "transacting business" 
section of the statute, because it held that the single trip into New York by 
the defendant in an attempt to resolve problems was not sufficient to 
constitute transaction of business within the state. 
In Galgay Co., 504 F.2d 1062, (2d Cir. 1974), a New York 
corporation sued a Pennsylvania corporation in New York, basing its 
jurisdiction upon the "transacting business" section of the New York long-arm 
statute. The parties negotiated a contract by telephone, which was executed 
in New York. Plaintiff built machinery in New York and defendant came into 
the state transport it to into Pennsylvania where the plaintiff installed it. 
The Court of Appeals said that the in-state presence of the defendants, while 
essential, was only of "minor or accidental importance" and was insufficient to 
base jurisdiction. The execution of the contract in New York did not show 
purposeful business activity in New York on the part of defendant, because 
the contract was executed by plaintiffs. Finally, the court ruled that a 
clause of the contract which stated that it was to be interpreted and 
governed by New York law was merely a choice of law, and did not have 
jurisdictional implications. 
New Jersey's long-arm statute provides for in personam jurisdiction 
"consistent with due process of law". N. J. Court Rules, 4: 4-4 ( c) (1). 
This has been interpreted by the New Jersey Courts to allow service ot 
process to the outer bounds of due process. In Infomed v. Healthcare 
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of Louisville, 526 F.Supp. 1287, (D.N.J. 1981), the defendant, a Kentucky 
corporation, sent representatives into New Jersey to inspect the plaintiff's 
ability to perform a proposed contract and to review the terms of the 
contract. The contract provided that all of the work save installation was to 
be performed by the plaintiff in New Jersey. Defendant signed and accepted 
the contract in New Jersey, and the contract specifically provided for New 
York law to govern the contract. Relying on World-Wide Volkswagen, supra, 
the federal district court in New Jersey held that it could not, consistent 
with due process of law, exercise jurisdiction over defendant Healthcare. 
Infomed, 526 F. Supp. at 1289. The court based its holding on the fact that 
" [ d] efendant Healthcare clearly does not have sufficient ties with New Jersey 
so that it may be sued here for all purposes .... " Id. The single visit 
was "isolated" and could "hardly be characterized as purposefully availing 
oneself of the privilege of conducting activities within New Jersey such that it 
'should reasonably anticipate being hailed into court here'. World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, supra." Id. at 1289-90. The plaintiffs 
in-state activity was a unilateral act and by Hanson v. Denckla, could not 
serve as a basis for in personam jurisdiction. Finally, the choice of law 
provision of the contract does not constitute a consent to in pe.rsonam 
jurisdiction in New Jersey. 
Maintenance of jurisdiction over appellants in the present case would be 
contrary to the salutary principles enunciated in International Shoe, 
\\orld-Wide Volkswagen and the foregoing cases. 
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Moreover, because plaintiffs' causes of action must arise directly out of 
defendants' activities in the forum state, see Roskelley Co. '!_· Lerco. Inc. 
610 P. 2d at 1312, the mere fact that Roeck subsequently came to Utah and 
discussed a modification does not provide the necessary minimum contacts. 
Numerous cases hold that the mere in-state presence of the defendant 
engaging in some activities which relate in some degree to the litigation is not 
enough to show that the defendant is purposely availing himself of the state's 
laws. See, Kransco Manufacturing '!_· Markwitz, 656 F.2d 1376 (9th 
Cir. 1981); Galgay Bulletin Co., 504 F.2d 1062 (2d Cir. 1974); Carter Oil 
Apex Towing Co., 532 F.Supp. 364 (E.D. Ark. 1981); Activox, Inc. 
v. Envirotech Corp., 532 F.Supp. 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Infomed v. 
Healthcare of Louisville, 526 F.Supp. 1287 (D.N.J. 1981); Associated Inns! 
Restaurant Co. v. Development Associates, 516 F. Supp. 1023 (D. Colo. 1981); 
Dogan '!_. Harbert Construction Corp. , 507 F. Supp. 254 ( S. D. N. Y. 1980); 
Sayles Biltmore Bleacheries, Inc. v. Soft-Fab Textile Processors, 440 F. Supp. 
1010 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Weyrich '!_· Lively, 361 F.Supp. 1147 (D.Colo. 1973); 
Aurea Jewelry Creations, Inc.'!_· Lissona, 344 F.Supp. 179 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); 
Hydraulics Unlimited Manufacturing Co. v. BI J Manufacturing Co., 
323 F.Supp. 996 CD.Colo. 1971); Wood v. Moody-McMaster, Inc .. 
107 Ill.App.3d 116, 437 N.E.2d 373 (App. Ct. 1982); Northern Insurance Co. 
v. B. Elliott, Ltd., 117 Mich.App. 308, 323 N.W.2d 683 (Ct. App. 1982); 
McKee Electric Rauland-Borg Corp., 20 N.Y.2d 377, 229 N.E.2d, _ 
N.Y.S.2d (1967); Crompton v. Park Ward Motors, Pa. Super. _. 
445 A.2d 137 (1982). 
Requiring defendants to answer in Utah for their participation in a 
transaction executed in the province of Saskatchewan, the object of which was 
to exchange Canadian property for an ocean-going sailboat docked in 
California, is repugnant to the fundamental fairness principle of International 
Shoe and its progeny, It is difficult to imagine a more egregious instance 
involving a total lack of minimum contacts. 
ARGUMENT 
11 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ASSESSING DAMAGES WITHOUT A 
HEARING. 
In this case, the lower court awarded respondents the sum of $352, 000 
as damages for conversion of the boat, together with punitive damages in the 
amount of $200,000, and $100,000 for the rental value of the boat. In making 
this award, the court heard no evidence, conducted no hearing, and relied 
solely on the affidavit of Robert D. Kent, Jr., the secretary of Lancer 
Industries, Inc. 
The award of damages in default judgments is governed by Rule 55(b)(2) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides as follows: 
By the Court. In all other cases the party entitled to a 
judgment by default shall apply to the court therefor. If, in order 
to enable the court to enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it 
is necessary to take an account or to determine the amount of 
damages or to establish the truth of any averment by evidence or 
to make an investigation of any other matter, the court may conduct 
such hearings or order such references as it deems necessary and 
proper. 
The lower court's ruling is clearly erroneous in light of Security 
Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. West, 20 Utah 2d 292, 437 P. 2d 214 (1968). In 
that case a default judgment with punitive damages was entered against the 
appellant. In awarding punitive damages the trial court did not hear any 
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evidence or conduct a hearing. On appeal from a refusal to set aside the 
default judgment, the Utah Supreme court observed, "West also contends that 
the court erred in awarding punitive damages without proof. With this we 
agree, which in and of itself justifies a vacation of the default." Id. at 293, 
437 P.2d at 215. Other courts have adopted a similar position. See Valdery 
v. Sams, 307 P.2d 189, 191 (Colo. 1957); Franklin, 89 N.M. 118, 
, 547 P.2d 1160, 1167 (Ct. App. 1976); Walters, 534 P.2d 702 
(Okl. Ct. App. 1975); Johanson United Truck Lines, 383 P.2d 512, 516 
(Wash. 1963); Flahs Koegel 504 F.2d 702, 707, (2d Cir. 1974); Trans 
World Airlines, Inc. Hughes, 449 F.2d 51, 69-72 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'd 
other grounds, 409 U.S. 363, 93 S.Ct. 647, 34 L. Ed. 2d 577, reh. denied, 
410 U.S. 975 (1973). 
The court's award of $352, 000 as compensatory damages for "conversion" 
of the sailboat and $100, 000 in "rental value" was likewise erroneous in the 
absence of proof. 
It is well-settled that a default does not admit the amount of unliquidated 
damages. See, 6 Moore's Federal Practice § 55. 07 ( 1982). A default 
judgment entered on well-pleaded allegations establishes defendant's liability. 
Where damages are unliquidated and uncertain, Rule 55(b)(2) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure requires the plaintiff to prove the extent of damages 
established by the default. See Stritzler, 535 F.2d 148, 153-54 (1st 
Cir. 1976); Flaks v. Koegel, 504 F.2d 702, 707 (2d Cir. 1974); Trans World 
Airlines, Inc. Hughes, 449 F.2d 51, 69-72 (2nd Cir. 1971). on 
grounds, 409 U.S. 363, S.Ct. 647, 34 L. Ed. 2d 577, reh. denied, 410 U.S. 
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975 (1973); Gallegos v. Franklin, 89 N.M. 118, ' 547 p. 2d 1160' 1165 
tCt. App. 1976). 
Where the plaintiff's damages are for an unliquidated amount, it is error 
to assess damages after a default judgment without a hearing. See, e.g..:., 
Eisler '.:'.:· Stritzler, supra 535 F.2d at 153-54; Gill.'.:'.:· Stolow, 18 F.R.D. 508 
(S.D.N.Y. 1955). 
The damage awards for conversion in the amount of $352, 000 and rental 
value in the amount of $100, 000 were unliquidated and uncertain. There was 
no evidence offered to establish either of these figures other than plaintiff's 
consulory and self serving affidavit. In the absence of proof to establish a 
fixed, liquidated damage amount, the lower court erroneously awarded those 
damages. 
ARGUMENT 
Ill 
THE ULTIMATE SANCTION OF ENTERING DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
CONSTITUTED A DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS UNDER THE FACTS OF 
THIS CASE. 
It is fundamental that the lynchpin of due process consists of notice to a 
party before his or her rights are affected by judgment. See, Fuentes 
'.:'.:· Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 79, 92 S. Ct. 1983, , 32 L.Ed. 2d 566, 569 
(1972); Graham v. Sawaya, 632 P.2d 851, 853 (Utah 1981). In the present 
case, Hans Roeck was outside of the continental United States and out of 
communication with his attorneys at the time the discovery order and default 
judgment were entered, and had no notice or knowledge of these proceedings 
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(R. 256-57). Under such circumstances, entry of default judgment against 
him in the sum of $652, 000 constitutes a denial of due process. 
It is uniformly recognized that the ultimate sanction of striking H 
defendant's answer and entering a default is a drastic measure that should be 
sparingly used. See, W.W. ! W. B. Gardner, lnc. ::.._. Parkwest Village, 
Inc., 568 P.2d 734, 738 (Utah 1977); Tucker Realty, Inc.::.._. Nunley, 16 Utah 
2d 97, 396 P. 2d 410, 412 ( 1964); Flood ::.._. Simpson, 45 Cal. App. 3d 644, 119 
Cal. Rptr. 675, 680 (Ct. App. 1975); Housing Authority Alameda v. 
Gomez, 26 Cal. App. 3d 368, 371 102 Cal. Rptr. 657, 659 (Ct. App. 1972); 
Schrerrer v. Plaza Marina Commercial Corp. , 16 Cal. App. 3d 520, 523, 94 
Cal. Rptr. 85, 87 (Ct. App. 1971); Cinelli v. Radcliffe, 317 N.Y.S. 2d 97, 
98 (Sup. Ct. 1970). 
In Crummer ::.._. Beeler, 8 Cal. Rptr. 698 (1960), plaintiff brought suit 
against defendant for money allegedly had and received. On July 27, 1959, 
plaintiff mailed notice to defendant's attorney for the taking of defendant's 
deposition on august 11, 1959. By Jetter dated July 31, 1959, defendant's 
attorney suggested the alternative dates of July 23 and July 24. Plaintifrs 
attorney replied that he was "not deposed to consider any postponement." 
On August 6, 1959, defendant's attorney again wrote to plaintiff's counsel, 
informing him that defendant had moved to British Columbia, Canada, and 
offered to arrange for defendant to be present at a later date. Plaintiff's 
attorney responded that it was his intention to move the sanctions unless 
defendant appeared for the August 11 deposition. Defendant did not attencl 
the taking of his deposition on August 11 and plaintiff moved to strike 
:rn 
defendant's answer and to enter judgment by default. The court granted 
plaintifPs motion, and from the default judgment defendant appealed. The 
uppellate court reversed, holding that the penalty assessed was too drastic 
and constituted a clear abuse of discretion. Id. at 703. The court noted 
that the purpose of Rule 37 "and the other provisions relative to discovery is 
not to provide a weapon for punishment, forfeiture and the avoidance of a 
trial on the merits, but to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive 
determination of actions." Id. at 702 (emphasis added). It is further 
observed that "[i]n a legal sense, discretion is abused whenever, in its 
exercise, a court exceeds the bounds of reason, all the circumsrances before 
it being considered." Id. 
In view of the facts and circumstances of the present case, defendant's 
failure to comply with the court's discovery order is excusable, so as to 
preclude entry of default judgment consistent with due process. 
CONCLUSION 
It is undisputed that all of the activities relevant to defendants' alleged 
liability under the contract took place outside of Utah, and that defendants' 
amenability to service in Utah is premised upon telephone calls and 
correspondence, and a single trip to Utah to negotiate an agreement which is 
not at issue in this litigation. 
Applying the statutory and constitutional standards of personal 
jurisdiction to the facts of this case, it is clear that defendants' contacts with 
29 
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Ctah were de minimus and nut ul the natu1« Ill' quality as to tullill th,· 
requisites of due µrocess. The 1u<lt-(111<·11t be reversed ctnd rem:uHlcd t,, 
the district court for entry ot ;111 unkr dismissinµ: µl;unt1tl's complaint 1<>1· 
lack of personal jurisdict10n. 
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